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ABSTRACT 
We focus on strategic management as a critical issue for service delivery and explore the 
effects of strategy configurations among ownership types. Examining the strategic stance 
of public, nonprofit, and private service providers, we explore how and where different 
ownership types generate performance returns across customer, business, and social 
dimensions. Using a configurational approach, we find ideal strategy profiles among 
ownership types. The ideal strategy profile delivers both social and business performance 
returns for public; customer and social performance advantages for nonprofit; but only 
customer performance gains for private ownership types. Through additional analysis 
differences in the identity of prioritized stakeholders between ownership types are 
explored to interpret differences in strategy and performance. The influence of local 
government for public ownership versus the prioritization of funders for nonprofit and 
private ownership types is the one clear difference between service providers. 
Implications for public management theory and practice are identified and discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Organizations may possess multiple strategies, with varying degrees of priority 
accorded to different basic strategic stances (ideal types). Such hybrid 
organizational strategies are nonetheless likely to be associated with certain 
structures, processes and environments, which reflect the core argument of 
configurational theories that organizational viability is dependent on the fit 
between internal and external characteristics” (Beynon, Andrews, and Boyne 
2015, 2) 
 
Strategy is a means by which organizations can improve their performance and 
provide better public services (Boyne and Walker 2010) and is often conceptualized as 
the strategic stance of organizations. Strategy here is not categorical but can be 
understood as a set of different basic stances that combine in different ways to create a 
range of strategy configurations that service providers pursue (Beynon et al. 2015). This 
view reflects extant public management research that has established strategic stance as a 
multidimensional phenomenon (e.g. Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006; Andrews, 
Boyne, Law, and Walker 2008, 2009; Hodgkinson and Hughes 2014; Meier, O'Toole, 
Boyne, and Walker 2007; Meier, O’Toole, Boyne, Walker, Andrews 2010; Walker et al. 
2010).  
Consistent with configurational theory, the form strategy takes and its influence 
on service performance might depend on the ownership type responsible for service 
delivery, however, this has received little scholarly attention (Andrews, Boyne and 
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Walker 2011a). Subsequently, there is limited knowledge on the role of strategy at the 
disaggregated service level reducing knowledge on the performance effects of strategy in 
the sector, as highlighted by Boyne and Walker (2004, 2010) and Walker, Andrews, 
Boyne, Meier, and O’Toole (2010). This gives rise to our exploratory research question: 
how and where do different ownership types generate performance impacts? Informed by 
configurational theory, we examine the ideal strategy profile among different ownership 
types in public leisure delivery: public, nonprofit, and private service providers. In doing 
so, we seek to explain the performance effects of strategy configurations among these 
ownership types. Alongside this, additional analysis is conducted to explore differences 
in the prioritized stakeholders that potentially inform strategic formation and 
performance goals among ownership types. 
This exploratory study contributes to public management theory in three 
important ways. First, we examine strategy effects across a variety of performance 
dimensions, since a gain on one dimension may be obtained by sacrificing another 
(Andrews et al. 2011a); in doing so we extend research on the relationship between 
strategy and different dimensions of performance (Boyne and Walker 2010), accounting 
for performance trade-offs that are often neglected (Mikkelsen 2017). Second, and to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to test empirically the strategy configurations 
of the highest performing service providers among ownership types. Thus, linked to the 
first contribution we determine the ideal strategy configurations across different 
performance outcomes for each ownership type. Here we are responding to the call made 
by Boyne and Walker (2010) for a more nuanced examination of strategy and 
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performance. Third, it remains unclear if public service providers can be understood as 
operating in the same strategic space as external nonprofit and private service providers, 
despite operating in the same functional space. Thus, through additional analysis we 
explore the identity of prioritized stakeholders among ownership types, a considered best 
practice in performance comparison studies (Andersen, Boesen, and Pedersen 2016). 
Collectively, we contribute to public service practice by helping policymakers to arrive at 
better judgments on the circumstances under which ownership type matters, a 
contribution called for by Andrews et al. (2011a). 
The article is structured as follows: we first outline the theoretical foundations 
and exploratory model that frame the data analysis. Next, we identify ideal strategy 
profiles among ownership types and report their effects across customer, business, and 
social performance dimensions. Additional analysis is used to capture the identity of 
prioritized stakeholder groups to help interpret the strategy configurations and their 
performance effects among ownership types. Results and implications are then discussed. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Strategic stance 
The focus of this exploratory study is the role of strategic stance on the 
ownership–performance relationship, which captures the intended approach of the 
organization rather than its realized strategy (Andrews et al. 2006). In response to 
Boyne’s (2002) observation that there is no knowledge on whether successful 
management strategies in the private sector can be easily drawn upon by public agencies, 
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recent research has established the value of Miles and Snow’s prospector-defender-
reactor typology to public service organizations (e.g. Andrews et al. 2006, 2008, 2009). 
Such a strategy typology seeks to classify a public service organization’s strategy into 
one of a mutually exclusive set of basic strategy types (or boxes). These are presented as 
competitive strategies that serve as the foundation for competitive advantage. Such 
typologies are pertinent to New Public Management (NPM) oriented settings that are 
characterized by: a high degree of (i) administrative autonomy, (ii) performance-based 
budgets and (iii) market-like conditions; making these settings particularly receptive to 
conventional models of strategic management (Hansen and Ferlie 2016). Examples of 
such public service settings include public transit, leisure and culture services, education, 
some forms of healthcare, and so on. As explained aptly by Hansen and Ferlie (2016; 8): 
“Autonomy levels should be high because one fundamental contention is that the 
organizations can choose (Porter 1996) their strategy or even their industry. 
Market-like conditions should be high because the goal is to achieve a 
competitive advantage (Porter 1980)…Finally, the goal of strategic positioning is 
to perform better than competitors (to earn more profit) and this assumes that the 
budgetary funding should be performance-based”  
Porter’s (1980, 1985) typology of strategic positioning is an alternative to Miles and 
Snow’s and is equally applicable to NPM oriented service settings (Hansen and Ferlie 
2016). Porter (1985) offers three generic strategies for achieving superior performance: 
cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. Cost leadership is to be the lowest cost 
provider relative to direct competitors, where emphasis is focused on minimizing all costs 
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in all areas at the expense of value adding activities (Porter 1985). Typically, a successful 
cost leader can provide services of comparable quality to other equivalent offerings in the 
market place, while maintaining the lowest cost base relative to competitors (Hodgkinson 
2013). Differentiation by adding greater value relative to competitors can be used to 
create a unique customer experience to the masses (Porter 1985). This strategy does not 
ignore the importance of costs, but they are of secondary significance to the service 
offering (Hodgkinson 2013). Unlike cost leadership, however, there can be more than one 
successful differentiator if there are a number of attributes that are widely valued by 
customers (Porter 1985). The final generic strategy of focus is built around serving a 
particular niche very well and more effectively than competitors who are competing 
across market segments (Porter 1985). For instance, a cost focus can target price sensitive 
customers that are otherwise excluded by mass market offerings (Hodgkinson 2013). 
This orientation has, for instance, driven European sport policy intervention in service 
delivery on the grounds of equity (Vandermeerschen and Scheerder 2017).   
Faulkner and Bowman (1995) extend Porter’s typology by incorporating the 
concept of perceived service benefits and perceived price in a typology that includes 
value added, price based and hybrid types. Here there is an opportunity for organizations 
to move between stances over time, though similarly to Porter’s typology these types are 
considered to be distinct categories. Value added is reflective of Porter’s differentiation 
strategy, such that higher perceived benefits are associated with the offering, but typically 
at a higher relative price. Implementing a price based stance requires low pricing while 
maintaining service quality, in contrast to Porter’s cost leadership which does not 
 7 
 
necessarily result in low pricing. To be successful, this strategy requires customers to 
view price as an important determinant of purchasing behavior (Hodgkinson 2013) and as 
Vining (2011, 78) notes, “If agency prices are forced to approximate the marginal costs 
of delivery, then they may be subject to competition” which is central to the price-based 
strategic stance. While Porter (1985) contended that organizations should not pursue 
multiple generic strategies at any one time, owing to degradation of competitiveness, 
Faulkner and Bowman (1995) argue that it is possible to provide value at a lower price to 
differentiators, but at a level higher than price based types, which they refer to as hybrid.  
While the strategy literature has identified basic strategy categorizations, it does 
not necessarily mean that providers will strictly follow one type. Therefore, Hodgkinson 
and Hughes (2014) raise the question: can organizations pursue low cost, cost focus, 
value added, low price, and hybrid strategy types concurrently? The answer they uncover 
is yes, to lesser or greater degrees. Thus, there is a need to consider these basic strategy 
types as dimensions of strategy that can be mixed together to create different strategy 
configurations. Though “existing evidence provides preliminary clues about the strategies 
that are, on average, more likely to lead to better performance, and the circumstances 
under which they are most effective…the theoretical and empirical foundations of our 
knowledge on strategy in the public sector are very thin” (Boyne and Walker 2010, 189 
[emphasis added]). We explore the strategy configurations among ownership types to 
determine how different public service providers can ensure a sustainable advantage 
compared with rival organizations (Hansen and Jacobsen 2016). In doing so, we offer a 
more nuanced explanation of strategy effects.  
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Moreover, it is acknowledged that organizations’ strategic stance and 
performance goals will be influenced by prioritized stakeholder groups (Bryson 2004). 
While public sector services are shaped by strategic considerations (Boyne and Walker 
2010), performance criteria and their importance may vary depending on the stakeholders 
prioritized (Andersen et al. 2016). Hence, if service priorities vary among ownership 
types, this in turn may influence the performance goals different ownership types aspire 
to as well as the strategy configurations pursued. Yet, “the identity of prioritized 
stakeholders is seldom explicitly mentioned in comparisons of performance studies” 
(Andersen et al. 2016, 4), thus, we seek to capture this through additional analysis.   
The ideal profile approach 
Following the theorization of Venkatraman (1989), an ideal strategy profile is 
defined as the level of resource deployments along a set of strategy dimensions that are 
specific to a particular environment or service setting. A service organization’s degree of 
adherence to such a multidimensional strategy profile will be positively related to 
performance if it has a high level of setting–strategy fit. Deviation from this profile 
implies a weakness in setting–strategy fit resulting in a negative effect on performance. 
These effects are conceptualized and assessed as profile deviation (Vorhies and Morgan 
2003). 
On the few occasions that configurational analysis has been adopted in public 
management investigation, studies have not examined the effect of strategy 
configurations among ownership types (e.g. Beynon et al. 2015; Hodgkinson and Hughes 
2014). Using configuration theory we explore the strategy configurations pursued by the 
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highest performers for each ownership type, “these configurations are ideal because they 
represent complex gestalts of multiple, interdependent, and mutually reinforcing 
organizational characteristics that enable businesses to achieve their strategic goals” 
(Vorhies and Morgan 2003, 101). In other words, the assumption is made that higher 
performing service providers will differ from poorer performing providers in their 
strategy configuration. Thus, the specific combination of strategy dimensions adopted by 
the highest performers is deemed the ideal strategy profile because they have configured 
their strategy in a way that enables superior performance (Hughes and Morgan 2008; 
Venkatraman 1989; Vorhies and Morgan 2003). While the strategy profile(s) of lower 
performing service providers is deemed the non-ideal. The ideal profile approach is 
particularly appropriate for this exploratory study, as it allows for the specification of an 
ideal profile to be empirically developed and in turn, provides the ability to demonstrate 
whether or not adherence to an ideal strategy profile has systematic implications for 
performance among ownership types (for a detailed overview of ideal profile analysis see 
Hughes and Morgan 2008; Venkatraman 1989, 1990; Vorhies and Morgan 2003). 
 
EXPLORATORY MODEL 
The aim of this exploratory model is twofold. First, we attempt to identify 
strategy configurations that contribute to significant differences in performance among 
ownership types and thus develop insights into how higher performing service providers 
differ from lower performing counterparts. This will point to how different ownership 
types generate performance and where performance returns are realized. Second, we 
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account for differences in the prioritized stakeholders between ownership types to help 
our interpretation of the ideal strategy profiles and their respective performance outcomes. 
Three ownership types are examined: 
First, public ownership involves local government authorities’ directly managing 
service delivery. The local authority takes full responsibility for income, expenditure, 
pricing and programming, and is accountable for all risk involved. Consequently, inhouse 
public providers receive a considerably higher level of local authority subsidy than any 
other ownership type. However, long term strategic financial planning is weak, since 
investments often depend on annual budget planning cycles, with leisure departments 
needing to bid against other council departments with higher political priority (Audit 
Commission 2006). With restricted access to capital, very little time and money is spent 
on addressing the needs of customers, illustrated by ineffective marketing and missed 
opportunities to increase income, address the needs of priority groups, and improve 
overall participation (Audit Commission 2006). The characteristics of this ownership 
type would then suggest a bias toward a strategic stance of low cost above all other 
strategy dimensions. 
Second, nonprofit ownership involves the local authority transferring the service 
to a nonprofit trust that retains all income and incurs all expenditure. The local authority 
usually leases premises to a nonprofit trust on a long term lease, typically between 15 and 
25 years, in return for a nominal rent (Audit Commission 2006). Outsourcing to nonprofit 
trusts has been a response from local government to financial pressure since charitable 
trusts obtain various tax exemptions (Reid 2003). However, the reinvestment of 
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significant levels of savings in leisure provision is infrequent and where taxation savings 
are reinvested they have supported maintenance budgets rather than assisted the needed 
improvement of facilities (Audit Commission 2006). The subsequent reduction of local 
government subsidies can increase financial pressures and as a result some are forced to 
concentrate on profit-oriented activities in order to establish financial stability (Audit 
Commission 2006). Given their charitable status, this ownership type will likely pursue 
cost focus and low price for social inclusion purposes.  
Third, private ownership occurs when a private agent is granted the lease of a 
leisure facility, usually lasting anywhere from 5 to 30 years, and retains all income and is 
generally responsible for most expenditure. The cost incurred by the local authority is 
substantially lower than the setup costs incurred when choosing other ownership types 
(Audit Commission 2006). The aim here is to utilize the management skills and business 
acumen of private agents. The financial performance of private providers appears on 
average to be stronger than for the other ownership types, attributable to a superior level 
of customer profiling (Audit Commission 2006). Private ownership types invest more 
capital into public sector leisure facilities with regular investment in new equipment, 
redecoration, and refurbishment (Mintel 2005). Stance in this ownership type will likely 
reflect value added for higher pricing.  
Regarding performance, there is a need to (i) cover different dimensions of 
performance to account for the possibility of performance tradeoffs (Andrews et al. 
2011a) and (ii) clearly outline the goals and context of the research setting to justify those 
dimensions examined (Andersen et al. 2016). The three performance dimensions of 
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customer, business, and social reflect the multiple and often conflicting goals present in 
the sector (Boyne and Walker 2010). More than this, they reflect the reasoning of Vining 
(2011) that in the application of private sector management frameworks, goal differences 
between the private sector and public sector must be acknowledged and explicitly 
incorporated. Following Vining’s (2011) overview of Moore’s conception of public value, 
two of the three performance dimensions examined here are consistent with the 
normative perspective of public agencies. Specifically, the customer dimension reflects 
public value as customer satisfaction and the social dimension reflects public value as the 
achievement of political mandates (such as the aim to increase sport participation among 
disadvantaged citizens in UK sport policy). The business dimension comprising 
traditional for-profit measures such as profitability and market share would typically be 
deemed inapplicable to the public sector context (Vining 2011). However, as Andersen 
and Jakobsen (2011), and Hansen and Ferlie (2016), and Vining (2011) illustrate, there 
are many competitive service settings where customers are charged to use a public 
service, where intense competitive rivalry can exist, and where economic performance is 
pivotal to service sustainability; leisure is a case in point. 
The analysis does not begin with any a priori expectations about the strategy 
configurations of different ownership types, nor in how they differ, but we present three 
exploratory propositions: first, the strategy configurations of different ownership types 
will comprise distinctive combinations of basic strategy dimensions; second, the ideal 
strategy configuration will vary among different ownership types; and third, the 
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performance implications of these ideal strategy configurations will vary by ownership 
type 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Study context 
The unit of analysis is the leisure facilities overseen by English local governments. 
In England leisure services are discretionary in that local government authorities can 
choose whether or not they make these available to their community, which contributes 
to the variability in provision among local authorities. In urban areas, leisure service 
provision is the responsibility of London boroughs, metropolitan boroughs, and unitary 
authorities, and in rural areas, service provision is the responsibility of district councils 
(Alonso et al. 2015). Under the conditions of market supply and demand, leisure facilities 
are embroiled in market processes and must develop strategies that allow them to 
compete and succeed (Walker et al. 2011). In other words, a leisure facility experiencing 
market failure may be forced to close, given the reliance on income from the market as 
opposed to public funding. 
We acknowledge that public leisure is not a homogeneous field and that both 
strategy and ownership may be contingent on the specific kind of services provided. In 
our research design, therefore, we control for the range of activities offered by each 
facility (for public, nonprofit, and private ownership types) that comprise the target 
population from which our sample is derived. Doing so ensures that ownership types are 
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comparable: of the 540 public providers, all offer a health and fitness suite, 314 have a 
swimming pool (58%), and 401 have access to a sports hall (74%). There is a fitness suite 
facility in all 287 nonprofit providers, with 196 of those offering a swimming pool (68%), 
and 204 a sports hall (71%). Finally, out of the 233 private providers, all include a fitness 
suite in their provision, with 185 providing a pool (79%) and 161 offering a sports hall 
(69%).  
Data generation 
To circumvent common method bias issues, the data is drawn from three separate 
sources: (1) a mail survey questionnaire that we administered to leisure facilities in 
England to obtain data on strategic stance, customer performance, and business 
performance; (2) secondary objective data on ownership types gathered annually by 
Leisure DB in a survey of all facilities in the UK (to inform Government records of 
leisure provision in the UK); and, (3) secondary objective data on social performance 
collected by Leisure DB in a separate audit of facilities. 
A four stage survey administration protocol was followed and involved pre-
notification, mailing of a full questionnaire pack, first reminder letter, and second 
reminder consisting of a full questionnaire pack. As recommended by Jakobsen and 
Jensen (2015) and Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003), a number of 
precautions were taken to strengthen the survey instrument against potential common 
method bias, including: different response formats across questions; guarantees of 
respondent confidentiality and anonymity to reduce respondent apprehension; assurances 
to respondents that there were no right or wrong answers; measurement scales placed in 
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random order; non idealized responses and wording neutrality adopted; questionnaire 
length reduced; and detailed instructions for its completion provided. Consistent with 
extant research examining the strategic characteristics of service providers and given the 
unit of analysis, we selected facility level managers as key informants. 280 of those 
surveyed responded resulting in an overall response rate of 26%. The total number of 
respondents comprising each ownership type is: 152 public facilities, 75 nonprofit 
facilities, and 53 private facilities. Non response bias was examined by comparing a 
random sample of 100 respondents and 100 non respondents using objective data on adult 
membership numbers and cost of access. No significant differences were found for adult 
membership (F = .129; ns) nor cost (F = 2.126; ns). 
Measures 
Service performance 
First, customer performance comprises customer satisfaction, customer value, 
quality of services, and development of services. Second, four business performance 
items are used that place emphasis on new customer sales, profitability, market share, and 
marketing. Performance measures were scaled as (1) very poor to (7) excellent, when 
comparing performance over the past 3 years to that of other competing facilities. Scale 
reliability was assessed through Cronbach Alpha. Both the business performance (α = 
0.82) and customer performance (α = 0.81) scales were deemed reliable. Third, social 
performance was gauged using objective individual facility usage records compared with 
the postcode analysis of the population in the facility’s three mile catchment area. The 
focus here is on the participation of lower socioeconomic groups and older people. 
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Including the three dimensions of performance creates a data set with both subjective and 
objective measures of performance, which is rare in public management research and 
reduces the risk of common method bias (Meier and O’Toole 2013). However, a 
limitation of this measure is that access to objective social inclusion data for the whole 
sample was not available. Of those facilities that responded, social inclusion data was 
only available for 19 publicly-managed facilities, 18 nonprofit facilities, and 17 privately-
managed facilities. 
 
Strategy dimensions 
Strategy descriptors were drawn from Porter’s (1985), and Faulkner and 
Bowman’s (1995) strategy typologies and included: low cost, cost focus, value added, 
low price, and hybrid. In adopting the self-typing paragraph descriptor approach (James 
and Hatten 1995) facility managers characterized the facility strategy being pursued from 
five short unlabelled paragraphs that depicted the strategy dimensions under examination 
(Appendix 1). Since public organizations vary in the extent to which they prioritize 
different strategies (Hodgkinson and Hughes 2014) and in following established practice 
(e.g. Boyne and Walker 2010), the strategy measures reflect the extent to which survey 
respondents agree that their organization can be characterized as low cost, cost focus, 
value added, low price, and hybrid on a Likert scale ranging from (1) “very little” to (7) 
“great deal”. 
Data analysis 
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We would expect that the highest performers will pursue a different strategy 
configuration relative to their lower performing counterparts. This is the fundamental 
tenet of profile analysis (Venkatraman 1990). In other words, if the strategy pursued by 
the highest performers can be identified this can be classified as the ideal profile for 
others to follow, i.e. the gold standard. Conversely, calculating the profile deviation score 
reflects the extent to which the rest differ from the highest performers, and if this 
difference is statistically significant deviation from the ideal strategy configuration can be 
deemed negative for performance (Venkatraman 1989, 1990; Vorhies and Morgan 2003). 
This technique captures the complexity of strategy effects in the public sector and is akin 
to the benchmarking approaches English local governments have used to “recognize the 
best performing councils and spread best practice” (Ashworth et al. 2009, 174); hence the 
focus on the highest performers to determine the ideal strategy configurations. 
Specifically, the ideal profile approach is used to empirically derive the strategy 
configuration of the highest performers for business performance, customer performance, 
and social performance, for each ownership type (public, non-profit, private). Consistent 
with extant literature, the highest performing public, non-profit, and private service 
providers are identified as those that fall within the top 15% boundary on performance 
scores (Hughes and Morgan 2008; Venkatraman 1990). The mean scores reported by 
these highest performers across the five strategy dimensions (i.e. the degree to which they 
emphasize low cost, cost focus, value added, low price, and hybrid strategy dimensions) 
are then calculated for each ownership type. To be clear, this is a subgroup of the total 
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respondent samples (for each ownership type) that forms the ideal strategy profile1. Next, 
an ideal profile deviation score is calculated by subtracting the mean values reported by 
lower performers (i.e. the rest of the ownership sample) from the mean values reported 
by the highest performers, across the same basic strategy dimensions. These are then 
squared, summed, and square rooted to create a profile deviation score (Venkatraman 
1990). To emphasise, a negative relationship between the strategy profile deviation score 
and performance would indicate that the ideal strategy empirically derived from the 
highest performers is conducive for higher performance. To assess the robustness of the 
results, regressions containing deviation from the ideal strategy profile of the highest 
performers are compared with models containing deviation from the alternative non ideal 
strategy profile of the lower performers (Hughes and Morgan 2008); if no differences are 
reported, strategy has no significant effect. 
 
RESULTS 
This section presents the composition of the ideal strategy profiles relative to the 
non ideal profiles for each ownership type. The regression results are presented in Table 
1 and the ideal and non ideal strategy profile mean values are shown in Appendix 2 and 3. 
The findings presented in Table 1 support suggestions that strategy does matter to the 
ownership–performance relationship and puts into spotlight important performance 
tradeoffs that exist between customer performance, business performance, and social 
performance. 
                                                          
1 We did not replace missing values for any respondent. There was one instance of missing data for 
customer performance and four cases on business performance for public ownership types only. 
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<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
For public ownership, the results demonstrate deteriorations in business 
performance (-0.31, p ≤ 0.01) and social performance (-0.45; p ≤ 0.10) when they deviate 
from the ideal strategy profile. For nonprofit and private ownership types, deteriorations 
in customer performance are observed when they deviate from the ideal strategy profile 
(nonprofit: -0.39; p ≤ 0.01; private: -0.27; p ≤ 0.10). Nonprofit types in addition suffer 
reduced social performance when deviating from the ideal strategy profile (-0.72; p ≤ 
0.01). There appear, then, to be performance tradeoffs at play when the role of strategy is 
accounted for that must be balanced against ownership type for service delivery.  
Nonsignificant findings imply that deviation from the ideal strategy combination 
does not materially affect performance. For instance, public providers do not suffer 
deteriorations in customer performance when they do not closely match the strategy 
profile of the highest performers. This suggests other factors are at play in explaining 
performance in this case. The same is true for nonprofit ownership for business 
performance and for private ownership for business and social performance. For 
completeness, we replicate this analysis with organizational size as a control variable 
using objective data obtained on total membership of each leisure facility as a proxy. The 
results are presented in Appendix 4 and as can be observed, organizational size is not a 
significant contributor to explaining performance in any of the regression models and the 
results of the ideal profiles remain unchanged. 
 We now explain the form of the ideal strategy configurations among ownership 
types based on the degrees of priority accorded to the five different basic strategic stances 
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(e.g. Beynon et al. 2015): for public ownership the ideal strategy configuration for 
business performance prioritizes value added (6.00) and hybrid (5.25) dimensions, and 
for social performance cost focus (7.00), low price (7.00) and value added (6.00) 
dimensions. For nonprofit ownership the ideal strategy configuration for customer 
performance prioritizes cost focus (6.00), low price (5.64), and to a much lesser extent 
value added (4.73). Similarly, for social performance, the ideal configuration emphasizes 
cost focus (6.00), low price (5.00) and hybrid (5.00) dimensions. Finally, for private 
ownership customer performance advantages are achievable through a strategy 
configuration that emphasizes hybrid (5.58), cost focus (5.25), and value added (5.08) 
dimensions. 
Additional analysis 
Multivariate analysis of variance was performed to examine differences in the 
identity of prioritized stakeholder groups among ownership types to shed light on the 
performance goals they may aspire to and strategy configurations pursued, with Tukey’s 
post hoc test for identifying statistically significant differences among ownership types. 
For the purpose of additional analysis seven possible stakeholder groups were identified 
from discussions with five service managers, scholars in the field of public management, 
and with reference to the literature (e.g. Freeman 1984). The groups identified include 
local government, employees, customers, suppliers, funders, local community, and 
government agencies. In acknowledging that the priority of stakeholders will likely vary 
among ownership types, respondents rated these groups by their level of influence on the 
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strategy development process on a Likert scale ranging from (1) “very little” to (7) “great 
deal”. Table 2 presents the results. 
<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>> 
While it may be assumed that a normative approach to service provision is superficially, 
at least, more suited to public and nonprofit ownership types that are expected to focus on 
the intrinsic worth of wider groups and on issues such as public health, sport 
development, youth engagement, and so on, but evidence for this case is limited. We find 
no significant disparity in the prioritization of local community, government agencies, or 
customers between public and nonprofit ownership types relative to private providers. 
Though, we note that nonprofit providers prioritize customers to a greater extent than 
publicly-owned ones. The influence of local government in public provision versus the 
pressure to secure funds for nonprofit and private providers is the one clear difference 
between ownership types that emerges from table 2.  
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper set out to examine how and where different ownership types generate 
performance returns by exploring the effects of strategy configurations. Three 
observations can be made: first, there are performance considerations that need to be 
taken when determining the best ownership type for managing public services; second, 
depending on ownership type strategy configurations have clear performance 
implications in many cases; third, and most importantly, the ideal strategy profile of each 
ownership type is more important for maximizing service performance and reconciling 
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performance dimensions rather than simply ownership type in itself. Consistent with 
Andrews et al.’s (2011a) theorization, then, we find that ownership effects on 
performance are contingent on strategy. The findings thus concur with Andersen and 
Jakobsen’s (2011) rejection of the simplistic relationship between the type of ownership 
and service performance. Though outsourcing public sector service delivery to external 
ownership (e.g. nonprofit and private providers) is often looked to as a means to more 
effective and efficient service provision, the performance effects of ownership types must 
be explored in the context of strategy. 
In environments with less public funding and lower degrees of political control, 
Boyne and Walker (2010) suggest that prospecting–responding to new customer needs in 
the marketplace through innovation–maybe a logical choice for public organizations. 
This is supported by Hodgkinson and Hughes (2014) who suggest that the ability to 
deliver superior value in response to changing customer needs faster than competitors, 
termed “value differentiation”, is a means to greater performance returns. They also 
report that an “equilibrial” configuration that offers an above average value proposition 
while simultaneously balancing costs and prices for affordability is a secondary route to 
performance gains. Though Hodgkinson and Hughes (2014) sought to investigate the net 
effects of strategy configurations across ownership types rather than among ownership 
types, there are a number of similarities with the findings reported here at the 
disaggregated level. The ideal strategy profiles for each ownership type share common 
traits with the value differentiation and equilibrial strategy configurations reported to be 
the two most effective when average effects are examined (Hodgkinson and Hughes 
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2014). Likewise, the non ideal strategy profiles presented here appear in many cases to 
reflect Hodgkinson and Hughes’s (2014) chaotic stance, the least effective of their 
strategy configurations.  
However, since extant research has only established the average effects of 
strategy in the sector (Boyne and Walker 2010) there is a danger of concluding that 
strategy is always important for the performance of public service organizations. This is 
not always the case which raises the need for stronger theory testing of the relationship 
between strategy profiles and service performance dimensions. Specifically, the 
relationship between strategy and ownership type deserves more attention in the public 
administration and management literatures as it is clearly evident that by neglecting 
environmental peculiarities such as ownership, full understanding of the capacity for 
strategy to influence service performance cannot be realized. For example, when 
deviation from the ideal profile is found to be nonsignificant, it is likely that other 
substantive organizational variables are at play and it is necessary to look again and 
identify contingencies that facilitate performance among ownership types.  
 Moreover, equifinality among the ideal strategy configurations adds further 
complexity when explaining strategy effects among ownership types that coexist in 
service delivery. To elaborate, the same ideal strategy profile can carry different 
performance outcomes depending on the type of ownership examined. For instance, an 
ideal strategy configuration that prioritizes cost focus, value added and low price delivers 
social performance advantages for public ownership, but a very similar strategy 
configuration carries customer performance advantages for nonprofit ownership. This 
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finding would suggest that the same ideal strategy configuration may confer different 
performance outcomes between ownership types, and highlights the complexity of 
equifinality as raised by Venkatraman (1989). We interpret this finding to mean that the 
operationalization of strategic stance from the intended strategy to that which is being 
realized in practice may vary between ownership types. Such that while the strategy 
pursued may be similar between two different ownership types (i.e. their strategic stance 
as examined here), how it is interpreted and executed appears to vary such that what is 
being realized in practice may be very different, despite the similar strategy configuration 
adopted. In turn, variation in the realized strategy leads to differing outcomes among 
ownership types.  
By using ownership as a key contingency there is an opportunity to better explain 
how strategy and management variables can shape performance, which may be necessary 
to provide stronger theory testing in public management research. Thus, the combination 
of strategic stance and action may be more complex than previously captured and 
strategy research would benefit from greater configurational thinking to establish what is 
being realized in practice; i.e. a move away from a focus on strategic intent toward a 
greater consideration of emergent strategy execution such as the role of improvisation. 
Andrews et al. (2011a) reflect that the degree of political control might influence 
the relative weight attached to different dimensions of performance. The implication for 
public ownership types that face greater demands from multiple principals relative to 
nonprofit and private ownership types is that it may be impossible to achieve conflicting 
objectives that require contradictory strategies. Yet strategies can be mixed and combined 
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and need not be mutually exclusive or in conflict (Boyne and Walker 2004). Here we 
present an ideal strategy configuration for the achievement of conflicting goals.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
Since the impact of ownership type appears in part contingent on the 
configuration of strategy, as inferred by Andrews et al. (2011a) and Boyne and Walker 
(2010), policymakers should reject axiomatic perceptions of ownership types (Andersen 
and Jakobsen 2011). For example, public ownership should not necessarily be viewed as 
a cost burden, given that with the ideal strategy profile business performance returns can 
be realized. Following the additional analysis, we acknowledge that political constraints 
may inhibit the voluntary choices of strategy at the facility level for public ownership 
(Alonso et al. 2016). Policy makers should therefore be mindful to reduce constraints 
imposed as the potential for public providers to balance business and social performance 
is much stronger relative to external ownership types (nonprofit and private). 
To maximize business and social performance, publicly-managed facilities should 
emphasize value added, hybrid, cost focus, and low price. Nonprofit service providers 
should place strategic emphasis on cost focus, low price, and value added for maximizing 
customer performance, with additional emphasis on the hybrid dimension for social 
performance gains. Privately-managed facilities will experience customer performance 
gains through an ideal profile that simultaneously emphasizes value added, hybrid, and 
cost focus dimensions.  Ergo, we suggest that managers should consider their existing 
strategy profile relative to their ideal profile and seek to modify strategy if it is 
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inappropriate for achieving the desired performance goals for that ownership type. This is 
particularly important for the business and social performance of publicly-owned service 
providers; the customer and social performance of nonprofit providers; and, the customer 
performance of privately-owned public service providers.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This study uncovers ideal strategy configurations among ownership types. These 
ideal strategy configurations differ between ownership types and confer both social and 
business performance returns for public ownership, customer and social performance 
advantages for nonprofit ownership, and customer performance gains only for private 
ownership. However, this study was not without its limitations. First, by examining 
public, nonprofit, and private ownership types separately this study does not account for 
network effects that may occur when two or more service providers operate 
collaboratively within a single constituency. Future research should consider the 
embeddedness of ownership types into networks at the local government level. Second, it 
is likely that different service settings will require different strategy configurations for 
performance gains, thus it is difficult to generalize the results to other ownership types in 
different functional categories (Rainey 2011). Third, whilst the data gathered is shown to 
be reliable it is ultimately cross sectional in nature and does not allow for temporal 
observations to be made. Fourth, focusing only on strategic stance enables identification 
of the ideal strategy profiles among different ownership types, but this neglects other 
internal or external characteristics at play that could influence performance. Thus, 
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following configuration theory future research can seek to determine the optimum 
management and organizational factors that would enable different ownership types to 
adopt a new ideal strategy and contribute to public value creation at the domain level. 
Public value at this level is created through the activities of public service providers, 
service managers, and is influenced by service policy (Hodgkinson, Hannibal, Keating, 
Chester Buxton, and Bateman 2017). This interplay between actors, management, 
organizational, and policy factors can best be addressed through configurational 
approaches. 
To conclude, while the strategy concept in the public sector remains conceptually 
ambiguous, the focus here is on strategic stance; a very specific element of strategy. 
Understanding why particular strategy configurations are pursued by different service 
providers is beyond the scope of this paper. Such an examination would have to account 
for management, organization, and external variables. Rather, this study concerns the 
effects of strategy configurations among ownership types. This is done in order to 
provide a more accurate understanding of the role of strategy at the disaggregated level, 
rather than only examining its average performance effects across the sector, which has 
thus far led to surface level understanding of strategy (Boyne and Walker 2010).  
It is important to highlight that the three ownership types examined all coexist in 
service delivery, and represent different public service providers rather than different 
public sector organizations. Since higher performers differ considerably from their lower 
performing counterparts in the strategy configurations pursued under the same ownership 
type (e.g. private ownership does not uniformly pursue one strategy configuration, nor do 
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public and nonprofit ownership types) future performance comparison studies must 
account for variation within each form of ownership as differences will inevitably be 
found. This is imperative if more fine grained insights on strategy and performance are to 
be uncovered. 
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Table 1  Regression resultsa 
 ‘Ideal’ Fit Models Random ‘Non-Ideal’ Models 
 Profile 
deviation 
(misfit) 
R2 F-value Profile 
deviation 
(misfit) 
R2 F-value 
Customer 
Performance       
Public -0.13 0.02 2.06 0.32** 0.10 13.11** 
Nonprofit -0.39** 0.15 9.02** -0.12 0.01 0.70 
Private -0.27† 0.08 3.09† 0.01 0.01 0.01 
       
Business 
Performance       
Public -0.31** 0.09 14.30 0.15† 0.02 2.97† 
Nonprofit -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.07 
Private -0.15 0.02 0.81 -0.09 0.01 0.32 
       
Social 
Performance       
Public -0.45† 0.20 3.75† 0.61** 0.37 8.81** 
Nonprofit -0.72** 0.52 13.82** -0.33 0.11 1.61 
Private -0.27 0.07 0.94 -0.40 0.16 2.24 
Notes: a Customer Performance, Business Performance and Social Performance represent the Dependent 
Variables; Profile Deviation is the Independent Variable. **p ≤ 0.01. *p ≤ 0.05. †p ≤ 0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
Table 2  MANOVA results for ownership and groups of influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stakeholder 
Influence 
Ownership (Means [SD]) F-ratio Tukey Test (p≤.05) 
 Public Nonprofit Private   
Local Authority 5.97 (1.22) 4.32 (1.84) 
4.68 
(1.39) 38.41** 
Nonprofit<Public 
Private<Public 
Employees 4.11 (1.54) 4.51 (1.71) 3.98 
(1.61) 
2.14 NSD 
Customers 4.38 (1.47) 4.89 (1.65) 
4.69 
(1.67) 2.88* Public<Nonprofit 
Suppliers 2.05 (1.38) 2.36 (1.38) 
2.21 
(1.36) 
1.37 NSD 
Lenders 1.36 (0.92) 1.95 (1.46) 
2.35 
(1.96) 12.57** 
Public<Nonprofit 
Public<Private 
Local Community 3.83 (1.50) 4.11 (1.68) 
3.83 
(1.49) 
0.89 NSD 
Government 
Agencies 
2.65 (1.66) 2.39 (1.26) 2.54 
(1.49) 
0.72 NSD 
Notes: **p ≤ 0.01. *p ≤ 0.05. NSD: no significant differences found. 
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Appendix 1  Descriptor strategy statements  
Low Cost, striving for a low cost position relative to competitors, achieved through an experience 
curve, tight cost and overhead control, and cost minimization in areas like service and 
advertising. 
Cost focus, reducing inequalities between the least advantaged groups and communities and the 
rest of society. The leisure facility seeks to include all citizens, achieved through targeted 
programming. 
Value Added, differentiating the product or service offering of the leisure facility, providing a 
service that is superior to competitors. Costs are of secondary significance to providing the 
service offering. 
Low Price, providing a service for those who cannot afford the opportunities offered by the 
private sector. A central motivation of the service is to ensure access for all citizens achieved 
through price subsidies or providing a low entry price. 
Hybrid, differentiating the product or service offering of the leisure facility to provide a service 
that is superior to competitors, whilst simultaneously maintaining a tight control on costs for a 
lower cost-base relative to competitors. 
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Appendix 2  Ideal strategy profilesa 
 Customer Performance Business Performance Social Performance  
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Public       
Low Cost 4.19 1.90 3.00 2.45 4.50 3.53 
Cost Focus 5.65 1.36 4.63 1.19 7.00 0.00 
Value 
Added 
4.89 1.71 6.00 2.14 6.00 1.41 
Low Price 4.81 1.97 4.13 2.36 7.00 0.00 
Hybrid 4.62 1.72 5.25 1.91 5.50 0.71 
       
Nonprofit       
Low Cost 3.64 1.65 3.50 1.84 2.00 1.00 
Cost Focus 6.00 1.45 4.80 1.87 6.00 1.00 
Value 
Added 
4.73 1.78 5.10 1.20 4.67 1.53 
Low Price 5.64 1.29 5.60 0.97 5.00 1.00 
Hybrid 4.64 1.94 5.90 0.74 5.00 2.65 
       
Private       
Low Cost 3.67 1.50 4.00 1.60 4.33 0.58 
Cost Focus 5.25 1.54 5.17 1.64 4.00 2.65 
Value 
Added 
5.08 1.68 4.67 1.56 3.67 0.58 
Low Price 4.33 1.97 4.25 1.86 4.00 1.00 
Hybrid 5.58 1.51 4.67 1.37 6.33 0.58 
Notes: a Figures in bold emphasize strategic priorities. Figures are only bolded for the ideal profiles that 
significantly contribute to performance, as reflected in the results presented in Table 1. 
 39 
 
Appendix 3  Non ideal strategy profiles 
 Customer Performance Business Performance Social Performance  
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Public       
Low Cost 4.65 1.67 4.38 1.99 4.00 4.24 
Cost Focus 5.54 1.68 5.63 1.41 6.00 1.41 
Value Added 3.43 1.52 4.50 1.69 3.00 1.41 
Low Price 5.11 1.52 5.25 2.12 4.50 2.12 
Hybrid 3.38 1.57 3.19 1.41 2.00 1.41 
       
Nonprofit       
Low Cost 4.32 2.03 4.20 2.15 3.67 2.08 
Cost Focus 5.55 1.60 5.10 2.02 6.67 0.58 
Value Added 4.59 1.53 4.00 1.49 4.00 2.65 
Low Price 5.09 1.57 5.30 1.57 5.33 2.08 
Hybrid 4.64 1.79 3.80 2.10 4.33 2.08 
       
Private       
Low Cost 5.08 1.12 4.46 1.81 5.00 1.00 
Cost Focus 5.85 1.28 5.23 1.36 5.00 2.65 
Value Added 4.23 1.79 4.46 1.76 3.67 0.58 
Low Price 5.08 1.75 5.08 1.75 4.67 0.58 
Hybrid 4.38 1.89 4.69 1.18 6.00 1.00 
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Appendix 4  Regression results with size as a control variablea 
 ‘Ideal’ Fit Models 
 Profile deviation (misfit) Size 
Customer Performance   
Public -0.15 -0.12 
Nonprofit -0.38** -0.07 
Private -0.27† -0.01 
   
Business Performance   
Public -0.30** 0.13 
Nonprofit -0.02 -0.11 
Private -0.14 0.14 
   
Social Performance   
Public -0.54* -0.27 
Nonprofit -0.73** -0.04 
Private -0.30 -0.11 
Notes: a Customer Performance, Business Performance and Social Performance represent the Dependent 
Variables; Profile Deviation is the Independent Variable. **p ≤ 0.01. *p ≤ 0.05. †p ≤ 0.10 
 
